Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Succeed on the Merits: The EEOC and Rule 12(b)(6) by Austin, Perry F.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 3 Article 7
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Succeed on the
Merits: The EEOC and Rule 12(b)(6)
Perry F. Austin
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Perry F. Austin, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Succeed on the Merits: The EEOC and Rule 12(b)(6),
59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1097 (2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol59/iss3/7
NOTES
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SUCCEED ON THE
MERITS: THE EEOC AND RULE 12(b)(6)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098
I. THE PLEADING STANDARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
A. Plausibility Pleading Under Twombly and Iqbal . . . . . . 1101
B. Pleading Employment Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
1. Did Twombly and Iqbal Overrule Swierkiewicz? . . . . 1105
2. The Port Authority Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
II. FILING SUIT FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. . . . . . . . . 1110
A. The Role of the EEOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110
B. Administrative Hurdles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
C. When the EEOC Files Suit on a Plaintiff’s Behalf . . . . . 1112
III. THE INEVITABLE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
A. Revisiting the Rationale for Plausibility Pleading . . . . . 1115
B. The Case Against Granting the Motion to Dismiss . . . . . 1118
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
1097
1098 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1097
INTRODUCTION
A group of female attorneys, living the reality of the gender wage
gap in the United States,1 sue their employer for discriminatory
practices in compensation.2 The United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) launches a full-scale investigation
into the claim,3 issues a determination that the employer committed
illegal acts of discrimination,4 and engages in failed conciliation ef-
forts with the employer.5 Deeming the case a litigation priority, the
EEOC chooses to expend limited administrative resources by filing
suit on the plaintiffs’ behalf.6 Despite the EEOC’s efforts, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
misses the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),7 a decision that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirms.8 The case is EEOC v. Port
Authority of New York & New Jersey,9 and, with thanks to the
Supreme Court’s “plausibility” pleading standard,10 it represents the
latest episode of the steep hurdle that employment discrimination
plaintiffs must overcome when they face the now inevitable motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).11
1. Women currently earn 83 percent as much as men in the United States. See Eileen
Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW RES. CTR. (July
1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-
u-s-despite-some-progress/ [https://perma.cc/LX48-LY9L]. 
2. See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 248-49 (2d Cir. 2014).
3. See id.; see also Plaintiff EEOC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of EEOC’s Rule 56(d) Cross-Motion
for Discovery at 3, EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 10 Civ. 7462(NRB), 2012 WL
1758128 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
4. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 249.
5. See id.; Complaint at 3, Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2012 WL 1758128.
6. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 248-49.
7. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2012 WL 1758128, at *1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
(permitting litigants to assert by motion the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted”). For a description of the factors that the EEOC considers when it
determines whether to bring suit on a plain-tiff ’s behalf, see infra Part II.C. 
8. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 249.
9. 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670, 678, 680 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 577 (2007).
11. See infra Part I.B.
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This Note takes issue with the dismissal of the EEOC’s pleadings
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)12 and suggests that
the policy rationale underlying plausibility pleading points against
dismissal when the EEOC files suit on a plaintiff ’s behalf.13 More
specifically, this Note argues that the policy concerns that drove
the establishment of plausibility pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly14 and its reaffirmation in Ashcroft v. Iqbal15—concerns
about dragging defendants into expensive and frivolous liti-
gation16—lack particular force when the EEOC files suit on a plain-
tiff ’s behalf. Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other statutory
schemes must exhaust their administrative remedies with the
EEOC before filing suit in federal court.17 By choosing to expend
limited administrative resources in pursuing litigation, the EEOC
operates as an effective gatekeeper.18 Not only will such employment
discrimination plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative
remedies with the EEOC, but also the EEOC will have issued a
determination of fault regarding the alleged unlawful employment
action and will have made the affirmative decision to represent the
plaintiff in federal court.19 In those cases, the risk of dragging
12. This Note is not the first effort to criticize the dismissal of the EEOC’s pleadings for
failure to state a claim. See Julie A. Totten & Michael W. Disotell, Between the Possible and
the Plausible: Employment Litigation in the Wake of Twombly and Iqbal, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 109, 120 n.112 (2015) (“That the EEOC, a government agency with pre-pleading
discovery authority, could even lose a motion to dismiss is surprising and illustrates the quix-
otic standards resulting from Twombly and Iqbal.”); J. Scott Pritchard, Comment, The Hidden
Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of Twombly and Iqbal on Employment
Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 757, 784 (2011) (“[T]he fact that the EEOC—a government agency with pre-pleading dis-
covery powers—could ever lose on a motion to dismiss is striking in and of itself.”). This Note
specifically argues that the policy rationale underlying the plausibility standard has much
less force when the EEOC brings suit on behalf of a plaintiff because the EEOC is extremely
unlikely to expend limited administrative resources on completely baseless matters. See infra
Part III.B.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
15. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
16. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that one of the two
“practical concerns [that] presumably explain[s] the Court’s dramatic departure from settled
procedural law” is that “[p]rivate antitrust litigation can be enormously expensive”).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part II.B.
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defendant employers into frivolous lawsuits should be significantly
diminished.20 The fact that the EEOC has decided to file on a
plaintiff ’s behalf should weigh strongly in favor of plausibility when
courts consider whether the EEOC’s pleadings survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).21 Accordingly, this Note suggests that
the EEOC’s pleadings are entitled to deferential review at the
12(b)(6) stage when it files on a plaintiff ’s behalf.
This Note proceeds in three main Parts. Part I discusses the
plausibility standard generally. It then surveys the current split
among the circuit courts of appeals regarding the status of pre-
Twombly precedent governing pleadings in employment discrimina-
tion cases. Part II overviews the procedural role of the EEOC in
employment discrimination suits. Part III explains why the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) in
employment discrimination actions has become inevitable, and
revisits the policy rationale underlying the plausibility standard.
Part III then suggests that the motion to dismiss has improperly
replaced the motion for summary judgment in the employment
discrimination context, allowing courts to evaluate the merits of a
plaintiff ’s lawsuit before a plaintiff is able to obtain key facts in his
or her favor through discovery. Finally, it argues that the policy
rationale behind plausibility pleading points strongly against
granting an employer’s motion to dismiss when the EEOC files suit
on behalf of a plaintiff because the EEOC’s function as a gatekeeper
prevents meritless suits from being filed in the first place.
I. THE PLEADING STANDARD
This Part details the establishment of the plausibility standard
in Twombly22 and its application to all civil cases in Iqbal,23 with a
particular focus on the policy rationale that motivated the Supreme
Court in those cases. It then discusses the applicability of plausibil-
ity pleading in employment discrimination cases and reviews the
status of pre-Twombly precedent governing the pleading standard
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
23. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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in employment discrimination cases in a post-Twombly world.
Finally, Part I introduces the facts in Port Authority, this Note’s il-
lustrative case.24
A. Plausibility Pleading Under Twombly and Iqbal
Perhaps no two decisions in the past decade have had a greater
effect on the mechanics of federal pretrial civil litigation than
Twombly and Iqbal.25 In Twombly, the Court established a height-
ened pleading standard, requiring that a plaintiff plead sufficient
facts to make his or her claim plausible—not merely possible or
conceivable.26 The Court affirmed the plausibility standard in Iqbal,
“transform[ing] civil litigation in federal courts” by permitting
courts to dismiss lawsuits with relative ease for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).27
Before the Court announced the plausibility standard in Twombly
and confirmed its application to all civil cases in Iqbal, federal
courts dismissed complaints for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) under the “no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v.
Gibson.28 In Conley, the Court held that a plaintiff need only plead
a “short and plain statement of the claim” under Rule 8(a)(2) to put
the defendant on notice of the lawsuit to survive a motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6).29
Citing concern with overloaded federal dockets and the increased
filing of frivolous lawsuits,30 the Court in Twombly and Iqbal all but
24. See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2014).
25. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2010).
26. See 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘enti-
tle[ment] to relief ’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (alteration in original) (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986))).
27. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Altered Civil Suits, to Detriment of Individuals,
N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/us/9-11-ruling-by-supreme-
court-has-transformed-civil-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/9UCM-ST5G]; see Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 684 (declining to narrow Twombly “to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dis-
pute”).
28. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
29. Id. at 47 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
30. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685-86; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
1102 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1097
abandoned the liberal “notice pleading” standard.31 Holding that a
plaintiff ’s complaint must state a claim that is “plausible on its
face,” the Court set a high bar for plaintiffs seeking relief in federal
court.32 The plausibility standard proves particularly cumbersome
in the employment discrimination context, in which plaintiffs are
very rarely able to cite detailed facts to support their claims for
relief.33 Since Twombly and Iqbal, it has become a regular—and
often successful—practice for defendants charged with employment
discrimination to file motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).34
Some courts have held that Twombly and Iqbal implicitly over-
ruled Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the unanimous ruling in which
the Court held that plaintiffs need not plead a prima facie case of
discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.35 The holding in
Swierkiewicz had the effect of permitting a plaintiff to proceed to
discovery to bolster his or her claim for discrimination, so long as
the plaintiff ’s complaint passed the relatively low bar under Con-
ley.36 Reasoning that the Court decided Swierkiewicz before it es-
tablished the more stringent plausibility standard, those courts
have held that a plausible employment discrimination complaint
must be one that states a prima facie case37 under the burden-shift-
ing scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.38
In announcing the plausibility standard, the Court in Twombly
was particularly concerned that the “notice pleading” standard
under Conley had led to overcrowded federal dockets.39 Under the
Court’s rationale, the Conley standard permitted plaintiffs to file
31. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-56.
32. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); see also Lucas F. Tesoriero, Note, Pre-Twombly Precedent:
Have Leatherman and Swierkiewicz Earned Retirement Too?, 65 DUKE L.J., 1521, 1537-39
(2016).
36. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (“This Court has never indicated that the require-
ments for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the pleading
standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
37. See infra Part I.B.1.
38. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
39. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“[I]t is one thing to be
cautious before dismissing a[ ] ... complaint in advance of discovery ... but quite another to
forget that proceeding to ... discovery can be expensive.” (internal citations omitted)).
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frivolous lawsuits in federal court, allowing plaintiffs to drag
defendants into expensive litigation, opening the discovery flood-
gates and forcing defendants to settle weak cases.40 The Twombly
Court took great pains to criticize the practical effect of Conley: “On
such a focused and literal reading of Conley ’s ‘no set of facts,’ a
wholly conclusory statement of the claim would survive a motion to
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a
plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to
support recovery.”41
The Court in Iqbal explicitly declined to narrow the holding in
Twombly to apply only in antitrust actions, announcing that the
plausibility standard “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil
actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”42
Justice David Souter, the author of the majority opinion in Twomb-
ly, dissented in Iqbal, arguing that the Iqbal majority misread the
holding in Twombly and incorrectly applied the plausibility stan-
dard.43 Justice Stephen Breyer also authored a vigorous dissent in
Iqbal, criticizing the Court’s rationale for expanding plausibility
pleading to all civil actions.44 In particular, Justice Breyer fore-
saw the difficulty that the plausibility standard would present to
plaintiffs whose claims depend on greater fact-finding through the
discovery process, and argued that district courts have internal
mechanisms at their disposal to prevent frivolous suits from
proceeding to discovery.45
40. See id. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants
to settle even anemic cases.”).
41. Id. at 561 (alteration in original).
42. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
43. See id. at 688, 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Twombly does not require a court at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.”). For
further discussion on the distinction between Twombly and Iqbal, see generally Luke Meier,
Why Twombly Is Good Law (but Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J.
709, 710-11 (2012) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal “have dissimilar analytical foundations”).
44. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 699-700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 700 (“The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons de-
signed to prevent unwarranted interference.”). Justice John Paul Stevens voiced similar
concerns in Twombly, writing in dissent that the majority’s concerns about overeager
plaintiffs dragging defendants into expensive litigation
merit careful case management, including strict control of discovery, careful
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid instructions to
juries; they do not, however, justify the dismissal of an adequately pleaded
complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers denying a
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B. Pleading Employment Discrimination
Discerning the specific requirements for satisfying the plausibility
standard in employment discrimination cases has generated much
confusion in the federal courts and has garnered a significant
amount of scholarly criticism.46 Generally speaking, when a charg-
ing plaintiff files suit for employment discrimination,47 she includes
facts in her complaint containing either direct or indirect evidence
of discrimination.48 Because modern plaintiffs rarely have direct
evidence of discrimination, however, most charging plaintiffs allege
facts that serve as indirect evidence of discriminatory employment
practices under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green.49
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set forth an evi-
dentiary burden-shifting scheme50 for plaintiffs charging indirect
evidence of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.51 Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, the plaintiff has the
charge that they in fact engaged in collective decisionmaking.
550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. For example, Professor Suja Thomas has argued that plausibility pleading is
unconstitutional because it imposes an insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs, and that, in
effect, it violates the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See Suja A. Thomas,
Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1890 (2008) (“[A]
complaint may be dismissed without a violation of the Seventh Amendment, but the court
must accept as true the facts and corresponding inferences pled by the complainant, however
probable or not.”).
47. The procedural requirements and enforcement mechanisms differ slightly when the
defendant is a private employer as opposed to a public one. See Enforcement, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y7BD-JVGR]. The vast majority
of charges that the EEOC handles involve private employers. See id. 
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012).
49. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
50. See id. In that case, a unanimous Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination 
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant’s qualifications.
Id. Although the McDonnell Douglas holding referenced a racial discrimination suit under
Title VII, courts extended the burden-shifting scheme to govern most employment discrimin-
ation claims. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shfting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 709 (1995).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.52 If the
plaintiff is successful, then the burden shifts to the defendant em-
ployer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for
the adverse employment action.53
1. Did Twombly and Iqbal Overrule Swierkiewicz? 
Since the Court announced the plausibility standard, the status
of pre-Twombly precedent governing pleadings remains unclear in
many contexts. In particular, legal scholars and courts cannot agree
on the appropriate legal standard governing pleadings in employ-
ment discrimination suits in a post-Twombly world.54 In Swier-
kiewicz v. Sorema N.A.55—a case the Court decided years before it
reformulated the pleadings standard in Twombly and Iqbal56—the
Court unanimously held that plaintiffs need not plead sufficient
facts meeting each element of the prima facie case in employment
discrimination suits. Swierkiewicz, in effect, relaxed the barrier that
employment discrimination plaintiffs must surpass to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.57
Because the Court eased the pleadings standard in employment
discrimination suits in Swierkiewicz 58 before it heightened the
pleadings standard for federal lawsuits generally in Twombly and
Iqbal,59 legal scholars and lower courts have questioned whether
Swierkiewicz remains good law.60 For a complaint to be plausible,
must it allege sufficient facts meeting each element of the corre-
52. See 411 U.S. at 802.
53. Id.
54. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1013-14; Charles
M. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1618-20 (2011); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Dis-
crimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 216-17, 219; Tesoriero, supra note 35, at 1522.
55. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
56. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 684 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).
57. Cf. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 513-14 (holding that employment discrimination
complaints “must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a)” to survive a motion to
dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
58. See id.
59. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
60. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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sponding prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas,61 or is it suffi-
cient for plaintiffs merely to state enough facts to “nudge[ ] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”?62
The courts of appeals have been unable to arrive at a consensus
response to that question. Generally speaking, at least four schools
of thought have emerged regarding the status of Swierkiewicz after
plausibility pleading63: (1) Twombly implicitly overruled Swierkie-
wicz;64 (2) Twombly did not overrule Swierkiewicz, and it continues
to be workable under the plausibility standard;65 (3) the correct
pleading standard remains “an open question” after Twombly and
Iqbal;66 and (4) Twombly did not overrule Swierkiewicz, but Swier-
kiewicz cannot be reconciled with the plausibility standard.67
61. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
63. Aside from the following attempts to reconcile Swierkiewicz with Twombly and Iqbal,
Professor Adam Steinman has argued that pre-Twombly precedent is irreconcilable with the
plausibility standard, and that plausibility pleading should be replaced with “plain pleading.”
See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300-02, 1305, 1328,
1356 (2010) (arguing that the “plain pleading” standard “reconciles prior authority, fits with
the text of the Federal Rules, and accomplishes the purposes that pleadings ought to serve
in the broader context of civil adjudication”).
64. See, e.g., McCone v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 582 F. App’x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim “because he failed to allege that he
suffered an adverse employment action,” which is an element of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case for gender discrimination); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009) (“[B]ecause Conley has been specifically repudiated ... so too has Swierkiewicz, at least
insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”).
65. See, e.g., McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 2015)
(holding that Twombly and Iqbal “did not overrule Swierkiewicz ’s holding that a plaintiff need
not plead the evidentiary standard for proving a Title VII claim”); Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-
Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that “the Swierkiewicz holding remains
good law” in part because “the Twombly Court ... cited Swierkiewicz with approval”). Professor
Charles Sullivan has offered a more radical approach in his efforts to preserve Swierkiewicz
post-Twombly. See Sullivan, supra note 54, at 1623. In Professor Sullivan’s view, employment
discrimination plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of discrimination should be permitted to plead
social science research showing the “pervasiveness of discrimination” to reach the plausibility
standard. Id. at 1662.
66. Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2012); accord Starr v. Baca,
652 F.3d 1202, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Even though the Court stated ... that it was applying
Rule 8(a), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading
standard.”).
67. See Meier, supra note 43, at 752 (“The best interpretation of the Iqbal opinion is not
that the Court intended to overrule cases such as Swierkiewicz, but rather that the Court was
bewildered by the nebulous Twombly opinion.”). 
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The plausibility standard has proved equally unworkable in the
district courts, even within circuits that have adopted a clear stance
on the status of Swierkiewicz in a post-Twombly world.68 District
court decisions within the Fourth Circuit—a circuit that has adopt-
ed the view that Twombly did not overrule Swierkiewicz, and that
Swierkiewicz remains good law69—illustrate the general confusion
regarding the appropriate pleading standard in employment dis-
crimination cases.
In McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation,
a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim of race discrimination under Title VII because her
pleadings “le[ft] open to speculation the cause for the defendant’s
decision to select someone other than her.”70 In affirming the district
court’s judgment, however, the panel held that the district court
applied an incorrect pleading standard in its analysis.71 The Fourth
Circuit unequivocally announced that Twombly and Iqbal “did not
overrule Swierkiewicz’s holding that a plaintiff need not plead the
evidentiary standard for proving a Title VII claim.”72
68. The impracticability of the plausibility standard has been similarly criticized in other
contexts. For example, courts have struggled to apply the standard in analyzing the suf-
ficiency of complaints alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2012)). See John R. Chiles & Zachary D. Miller, A Repurposed Consumer Protection Statute—
2013 Survey of TCPA Developments, 69 BUS. LAW. 633, 637 (2014). Recognizing the barrier
that the plausibility standard imposes on TCPA plaintiffs, those courts advocating a lower
pleading standard have required that plaintiffs plead only “minimal allegations regarding use
of an ATDS in recognition of the fact that the type of equipment used by the defendant to
place the ‘call’ is within the sole possession of the defendant at the pleading stage.” Maier v.
J.C. Penney Corp., No. 13cv0163-IEG(DHB), 2013 WL 3006415, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13,
2013) (citing In re Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., Text Spam Litig., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1260 (S.D.
Cal. 2012)).
69. See McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586; see also Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626
F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a
prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
70. 780 F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 2015).
71. See id. (“[W]hile the district court improperly applied the McDonnell Douglas
evidentiary standard in analyzing the sufficiency of McCleary-Evans’ complaint, contrary to
Swierkiewicz, the court nonetheless reached the correct conclusion under Twombly and
Iqbal.”); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., No. CCB-13-990, 2013 WL 5937735, at *3-4
(D. Md. Nov. 5, 2013) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed
to “state[ ] facts sufficient to meet the pleading requirements as to the fourth prong” of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme), aff ’d, 780 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2015).
72. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586; see also Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (holding that “a
plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a prima facie case in order to survive a
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Despite clear guidance from the Fourth Circuit, district courts
have struggled to apply the correct legal standard when faced with
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For example, in
Hayes v. Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc., the plaintiff filed suit
against the defendant employer for failure to hire based on race in
violation of Title VII.73 In evaluating whether the plaintiff ’s com-
plaint would survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the Hayes court began by listing the elements of a
prima facie case for failure to hire under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.74 
Without citing the relevant Fourth Circuit precedent governing
the pleading standard in employment discrimination cases, the
court found that the plaintiff ’s complaint was factually insuffi-
cient.75 Concluding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy one element of
the McDonnell Douglas scheme76—a framework that the Fourth
Circuit had announced “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading
requirement”77—the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiff ’s Title VII claim.78 The holding in Hayes, therefore,
stands in stark contrast with the pronouncements of the Fourth
Circuit that the McDonnell Douglas framework “may require dem-
onstrating more elements than are otherwise required to state a
claim for relief.”79 Hayes demonstrates the confusion of the lower
courts to discern the appropriate pleadings standard in employment
discrimination cases and the general failure of plausibility pleading
as a workable standard, even when the relevant circuit court issues
clear guidance on the subject.80
motion to dismiss” (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-15 (2002))).
73. No. 1:15cv1130(JCC/IDD), 2015 WL 6758294, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2015).
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id.
76. Id. (“Under the facts in the complaint, this claim will fail as a matter of law due to
Hayes [sic] failure to show that Defendant ultimately filled the position with someone of a
different race.”).
77. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 584 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510).
78. Hayes, 2015 WL 6758294, at *5.
79. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 584 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12).
80. This Note does not intend to criticize the district court for failing to respect judicial
hierarchy. On the contrary, the Hayes case merely serves as an example of the failure of
Twombly and Iqbal to provide lower courts with a meaningful standard to evaluate the suf-
ficiency of employment discrimination complaints. 
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2. The Port Authority Case
EEOC v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, the case
referenced in the Introduction of this Note, represents the extreme
barrier that the plausibility standard imposes on civil rights liti-
gants.81 In that case, a group of female attorneys filed a charge with
the EEOC, alleging that their employer, the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey (the Port Authority), had systematically paid
female lawyers less than their male counterparts in violation of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the EPA).82 The EEOC subsequently con-
ducted its investigation into the Port Authority’s compensation
practices.83 Following standard procedure, the EEOC issued a
determination letter, in which it concluded that the Port Authority
paid its female attorneys less than its male attorneys in violation of
the EPA.84 After failed conciliation efforts, the EEOC brought suit
on behalf of the charging female attorneys in federal court.85
In its complaint, the EEOC alleged that the Port Authority en-
gaged in discriminatory pay practices because it “has paid and con-
tinues to pay wages to its non-supervisory female attorneys at rates
less than the rates paid to male employees in the same estab-
lishments for substantially equal work for jobs the performance of
which requires skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions.”86 Following the Port
Authority’s answer, the EEOC responded to a series of court-ordered
interrogatories regarding its position as to the Port Authority’s pay
practices.87 In its responses, the EEOC averred that “all of the non-
supervisory attorney jobs in [the Port Authority’s] law department
are substantially equivalent and require the same skill, effort, and
responsibility.”88 Based on the EEOC’s pleadings and interrogatory
responses, and despite the EEOC’s extensive efforts in investigating
and prioritizing the charge, the district court dismissed the EEOC’s
81. 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 249.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Complaint, supra note 5, at 3-4.
87. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 250.
88. Id. at 251 (alteration in original).
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complaint, finding that its pleadings “d[id] not rise to the requisite
level of facial plausibility.”89
II. FILING SUIT FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Port Authority is merely one example of the harsh application of
the plausibility standard in employment discrimination suits. This
Part discusses the procedural role of the EEOC in employment
discrimination matters. It outlines the administrative remedies that
charging plaintiffs must generally exhaust. Finally, Part II dis-
cusses cases in which the EEOC brings suit on a plaintiff ’s behalf
and details the legal analysis in Port Authority.
A. The Role of the EEOC
As a part of its efforts to correct the long and dark history of
discrimination in the United States,90 Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,91 landmark legislation that outlawed discrimina-
tion in the workplace based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.92 Pursuant to the goal of eradicating workplace discrimina-
tion, Congress created the EEOC as an administrative body with
broad power to police discriminatory acts committed by private em-
ployers.93
89. EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 10 Civ. 7462 (NRB), 2012 WL 1758128, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
90. See Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, EEOC, Statement on 50th Anniversary of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ history/cra50th/index.cfm [https:
//perma.cc/P7F7-RHNU].
91. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
92. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
93. Id. §§ 2000e-4(a), (g), 2000e-5(a). In addition to enforcement authority with regard to
Title VII, the EEOC enforces other workplace antidiscrimination laws, including the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). See Facts About Equal Pay and Compensation
Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-epa.cfm [https://perma.cc/
Y8FA-MXLM].
2018] THE EEOC AND RULE 12(b)(6) 1111
B. Administrative Hurdles
The administrative hoops through which employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs must jump begin when the plaintiff files a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC.94 After receiving the charge, the
EEOC assesses it by sorting it into one of three categories95:
When an initial review of a charge reveals that it is “more likely
than not” that discrimination has occurred, the charge is
classified as Category A. These Category A charges receive
priority treatment and are investigated promptly. If, after the
initial charge review, it appears that the EEOC will need
additional evidence to determine whether the employer has
violated Title VII, the charge is classified as Category B.
Category B charges are investigated if the EEOC’s resources
permit. Finally, if a charge reflects an obviously meritless case,
or one outside the EEOC’s jurisdiction, it is classified as
Category C. These charges are not investigated and are prompt-
ly dismissed.96
After the initial triage, EEOC investigators pursue Category A and
Category B charges.97 
Following the completion of its investigation, the EEOC issues a
“letter of determination” to the relevant parties.98 The letter informs
the parties whether the EEOC has been able to determine if the
employer violated the law.99 If the EEOC is unable to make such a
determination, then the EEOC issues a right to sue letter to the
charging party.100 If the EEOC finds “reasonable cause” that the em-
ployer has committed a prohibited employment practice,101 however,
then the EEOC begins its efforts to eliminate that practice, in-
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (2017).
95. See DONALD R. LIVINGSTON & REED L. RUSSELL, EEOC LITIGATION AND CHARGE RES-
OLUTION § 7.XI.A (2d ed. 2014).
96. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 671, 694 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
97. LIVINGSTON & RUSSELL, supra note 95, § 7.XII.D.1-.3.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1601.21(a).
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cluding the conciliation process.102 If the EEOC’s conciliation efforts
are unsuccessful, then the EEOC either issues a right to sue letter
to the charging party103 or decides to initiate litigation in federal
court on behalf of the charging party.104
C. When the EEOC Files Suit on a Plaintiff’s Behalf
While the EEOC maintains the authority to file suit on behalf of
a charging party,105 “the EEOC is guided by ‘the overriding public
interest in equal employment opportunity ... asserted through direct
Federal enforcement.’”106 In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the Su-
preme Court declared that the EEOC “is in command of the pro-
cess”107 and, in other words, “essentially has a right of first refusal
over a charging party’s claim.”108 The Court also acknowledged that
the allocation of limited administrative resources is among the
factors that the EEOC considers when it decides to bring suit on a
plaintiff ’s behalf: “[I]t is the public agency’s province ... to determine
whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of
victim-specific relief.”109
Compared with the number of cases filed with the EEOC each
year, the EEOC pursues only a small percentage of cases on behalf
of charging parties.110 Recognizing the need to use its “limited
resources strategically to pursue its mission of eradicating work-
102. Id. § 1601.24(a).
103. Id. § 1601.28(b).
104. Id. § 1601.27.
105. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002) (“[W]henever the EEOC
chooses from among the many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a
particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide
make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief.”).
106. Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec.
4941 (1972)).
107. 534 U.S. at 291.
108. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 96, at 698.
109. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291-92.
110. For example, the EEOC pursued 114 enforcement actions in federal court in Fiscal
Year 2016. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2016, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/QXR8-KRAZ] [hereinafter
Litigation Statistics]. The EEOC received 91,503 charges that year. See Charge Statistics
(Charges filed with EEOC): FY 1997 Through FY 2016, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/E83X-UFMT] [hereinafter Charge Statis-
tics].
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place discrimination,”111 the EEOC adopted a National Enforcement
Plan on April 19, 1995 (the Plan).112 The Plan advanced three cate-
gories of cases that the EEOC would prioritize, including in its lit-
igation efforts113:
A. Cases involving violations of established anti-discrimination
principles, whether on an individual or systemic basis, including
Commissioner charge cases raising issues under the NEP, which
by their nature could have a potential significant impact beyond
the parties to the particular dispute....
B. Cases having the potential of promoting the development of
law supporting the antidiscrimination purposes of the statutes
enforced by the [EEOC]....
C. Cases involving the integrity or effectiveness of the [EEOC’s]
enforcement process, particularly the investigation and concilia-
tion of charges.114
The EEOC’s litigation efforts, therefore, represent a small per-
centage of charges that it receives each year and are conducted
pursuant to a national agenda as to how to allocate limited adminis-
trative resources to achieve its goal of eradicating discriminatory
workplace practices. Moreover, if the EEOC brings an enforcement
action, then that means it also has conducted “an assessment that
the strength and potential impact of the case supports the decision
to proceed.”115
In Fiscal Year 2011, the year in which the EEOC filed suit in
federal court on behalf of the charging plaintiffs in Port Authority,116
the EEOC received 99,947 charges of employment discrimination.117
That same year, the EEOC filed 300 lawsuits on behalf of a charg-
ing plaintiff.118 In other words, of the 99,947 charges of discrim-
111. National Enforcement Plan, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm [https://
perma.cc/UZE6-R7MQ].
112. Id. 
113. Id. (“These priority categories will apply, as appropriate, to ... litigation, including both
trial and appellate practice.”).
114. Id.
115. EEOC, supra note 111.
116. See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 10 Civ. 7462(NRB), 2012 WL 1758128, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
117. See Charge Statistics, supra note 110.
118. See Litigation Statistics, supra note 110.
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ination, the EEOC devoted its limited administrative resources to
pursue litigation on behalf of charging parties in 0.3 percent of the
charges it received.
The district court, applying the plausibility standard,119 granted
the Port Authority’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
preventing the charging women attorneys from proceeding to
discovery to gain additional facts to bolster their claim.120 In an
opinion that closely resembles one granting summary judgment,121
the court devoted multiple paragraphs to assessing the merits of the
EEOC’s claim for relief.122 After first grappling with the status of
Swierkiewicz,123 the Second Circuit similarly assessed the merits of
the EEOC’s EPA claim, concluding that that the EEOC failed to
satisfy the plausibility standard.124
III. THE INEVITABLE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM
This Part revisits the policy rationale that motivated the Court’s
holding in Twombly and Iqbal, and argues that the motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim has replaced the motion for sum-
mary judgment. It suggests that the plausibility standard has
improperly permitted courts to evaluate the merits of the suit on the
pleadings. Part III concludes by arguing that the policy rationale
behind plausibility pleading weighs strongly against dismissal when
the EEOC brings an enforcement action on behalf of a charging
119. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2012 WL 1758128, at *3.
120. See id. at *6.
121. See infra notes 142, 145 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2012 WL 1758128 at *6 (“The maturity curve spec-
ifies ranges of possible salaries based on experience; determinations of specific salaries within
those ranges must be based on other factors. The EEOC has alleged without substantiation
that those determinations are based on sex, but—without any analysis of job content—we can-
not rely on that bald assertion.”).
123. See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e con-
clude that, while a discrimination complaint need not allege facts establishing each element
of a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, it must at a minimum
assert nonconclusory factual matter.”).
124. See id. at 256 (“To be sure, the bulk of these cases concerned whether the plaintiffs
had proven their EPA claims following summary judgment or trial, not whether the plaintiffs
had adequately pleaded their claims. Nonetheless, these cases ... stand for a common prin-
ciple: a successful EPA claim depends on the comparison of actual job content; broad gen-
eralizations ... cannot suffice.”).
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party. In such cases, the EEOC’s pleadings should be granted defer-
ential review.
A. Revisiting the Rationale for Plausibility Pleading
Scholars and courts have intensely criticized the policy rationale
that motivated the Court in Twombly and Iqbal to establish the
plausibility standard—concerns about dragging defendants into
expensive litigation and preventing plaintiffs from filing meritless
lawsuits.125 Since the Court announced the plausibility standard,
district courts have become inundated with motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), especially in civil rights
cases like employment discrimination actions.126 After Twombly and
Iqbal, defense attorneys have viewed the motion to dismiss as stan-
dard procedure in pretrial civil litigation, perceiving the Court’s
holding in Twombly as an invitation to file such a motion in every
case possible.127
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court in
Swierkiewicz, directly confronted the opportunity to impose a
heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination suits,
but expressly declined the opportunity to take it.128 The Court
acknowledged the practical effect of the underlying policy rationale
that later drove the establishment of plausibility pleading in
Twombly and Iqbal, but it expressly decided not to travel down a
more rigorous pleading path in employment discrimination cases:
125. See supra Part I.B.
126. For an empirical analysis of rates of dismissal pre- and post-Iqbal, see Raymond H.
Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing
Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 268 (2011). Analyzing groups of employment and
housing discrimination decisions issued before and after Iqbal, Professor Brescia found a
26 percent increase in dismissal post-Iqbal. See id. In a similar study, Professor Patricia
Hatamyar found that courts “appear to be granting 12(b)(6) motions at a significantly higher
rate than they did under Conley.” Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010).
127. Faced with the inevitable motion to dismiss, now-Chief Judge Clay Land of the Middle
District of Georgia astutely criticized the proliferation of the 12(b)(6) motion in a post-
Twombly and Iqbal world, arguing that 12(b)(6) motions “almost always, either expressly or,
more often, implicitly, attempt to burden the plaintiff with establishing a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits under the guise of the ‘plausibly stating a claim’ requirement.”
Barker ex rel. U.S. v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (M.D.
Ga. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
128. Cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002).
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Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on conclusory
allegations of discrimination to go forward will burden the courts
and encourage disgruntled employees to bring unsubstantiated
suits. Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Fed-
eral Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination suits.... Furthermore, Rule 8(a)
establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a
claim will succeed on the merits. “Indeed it may appear on the
face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely
but that is not the test.”129
The Swierkiewicz Court held that the Federal Rules do not impose
a heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination
cases.130 Instead of citing concerns that a lower pleading standard
might invite frivolous litigation, courts should more appropriately
focus on broad citizen access to the federal courts—especially to
achieve the policy goal of combating discrimination in the work-
place—in order to allow potentially meritorious claims to proceed
past the pleadings stage.
Professor Arthur Miller has argued that the forces that led to
the establishment of the plausibility standard overlooked the
more important value of appropriate citizen access and allowing
potentially meritorious claims to proceed to discovery131: “[T]he
shortfall of Twombly and Iqbal is the Court’s failure to acknowledge
the potential those decisions have to impair meaningful access to
the federal courts.... The result is likely to operate in derogation of
effectuating rights and policy norms established by Congress and
state legislatures.”132
Moreover, plausibility pleading “erects a formidable—perhaps
insurmountable—barrier to civil rights lawsuits in particular.”133
Professor Elizabeth Schneider has suggested that “the greatest im-
129. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)).
130. See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ”).
131. See Miller, supra note 25, at 72.
132. Id. at 77.
133. Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox
of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 909 (2010).
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pact of this change in the landscape of federal pretrial practice is the
dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases from
federal courts in disproportionate numbers.”134 Professor Schneider
has further argued that the citizen-access argument lost in favor of
increased dismissal rates in part because “many federal judges have
expressed the view that employment discrimination and civil rights
cases are often weak and without merit.”135
The argument that broad citizen access is the more appropriate
concern rings especially true when the EEOC brings an enforcement
action on behalf of a charging party. In those cases, the EEOC takes
several affirmative steps before filing suit in federal court. Specifi-
cally, the EEOC: (1) triages the charge and sorts it into one of three
categories, weeding out completely baseless claims;136 (2) conducts
a full-scale investigation into the merits of the charge, finding
relevant facts;137 (3) issues a determination letter following the in-
vestigation, in which the EEOC assesses whether there is reason-
able cause to believe that the employer has violated the law;138 (4)
determines that the charging party’s claim meets the requirements
of its litigation priorities;139 and (5) expends finite administrative
resources by filing suit on behalf of the charging party.140 Professor
Suja Thomas has suggested that the plausibility standard has
transformed the motion to dismiss into “the new summary judgment
motion” because, similar to a motion for summary judgment, plau-
sibility pleading allows courts to evaluate the merits of the case on
the pleadings, especially in employment discrimination cases.141
The failings of plausibility pleading in employment discrimination
cases were on full display in the illustrative case, Port Authority.142
In that case, the Second Circuit’s efforts to determine whether the
EEOC’s pleadings were plausible led it to evaluate the merits of the
134. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 519 (2010). 
135. Id.
136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 97-99, 103-04 and accompanying text.
141. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 (2010).
142. 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
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case,143 an analysis that the court should conduct on a motion for
summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss the complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim.144 By dismissing the EEOC’s pleadings under
the plausibility standard,145 the court prevented the charging female
attorneys from gaining access to the federal courts. Even more strik-
ing is that the court dismissed the EEOC’s complaint for failure to
state a claim after the EEOC conducted a lengthy investigation,
concluded that the Port Authority violated the EPA, and decided to
expend limited administrative resources pursuing the case in fed-
eral court.146 Given that the Supreme Court intended the plausi-
bility standard to prevent baseless and meritless lawsuits from
proceeding to discovery, it “strains credulity”147 to imagine how that
same standard enabled a court to prevent a clearly meritorious
suit—not the frivolous sort the Court feared in Twombly and
Iqbal148—from proceeding past the pleadings stage.
B. The Case Against Granting the Motion to Dismiss
The policy justifications underlying the plausibility standard— in-
cluding preventing plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits149—have
much less force when the EEOC files on a plaintiff’s behalf. In those
cases, the EEOC will have investigated the employer’s alleged
discriminatory practices;150 issued a reasonable cause determination
that, in the agency’s view, the employer violated the law;151 and
made the affirmative decision to represent the plaintiff in federal
143. Cf. id. at 256 (“The EEOC’s bald recitation of the elements of an EPA claim and its
assertion that the attorneys at issue held ‘the same job code’ are plainly insufficient to support
a claim under the EPA.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). 
144. See Thomas, supra note 141, at 29-31 (discussing the similarities between motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment after the Twombly and Iqbal decisions).
145. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 259 (“The EEOC has not ... plausibly plead-
ed that these pay differentials existed despite the ... performance of ‘substantially equal’ work,
the only workplace ill addressed by the EPA.”). 
146. See id. at 249-50.
147. EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 10 Civ. 7462 (NRB), 2012 WL 1758128, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
148. See supra Part I.A.
149. See supra Part I.A.
150. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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court pursuant to the EEOC’s litigation priorities.152 Further, if the
EEOC decides to file suit on a plaintiff ’s behalf, then the EEOC
presumably believes that it has a reasonable case against the
defendant.153 Otherwise, the EEOC would not expend such great
administrative costs in prosecuting the case.154
Accordingly, the EEOC, a vast federal agency with broad pre-
discovery power, must believe that there are facts supporting the
plaintiff ’s claim that render the claim more than just possible or
conceivable. Indeed, in such a case, the plaintiff ’s claim for relief is
plausible—by the very definition of the term set forth in Twombly
and Iqbal—because the plaintiff will have “nudged [his or her]
claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible.”155
In his article, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, Professor David
Freeman Engstrom contends that the EEOC should be granted
greater authority to litigate discrimination suits, because 
an EEOC armed with robust gatekeeper powers over class and
systemic suits could settle, terminate, or steer cases in order to
(i) prevent duplicative, piggyback litigation efforts; (ii) counter-
act the repeat-player advantage that defendants might other-
wise enjoy; (iii) police cheap or collusive settlements by private
class counsel; and (iv) shield employers from transitional costs
where plaintiffs advance a new theory of liability that may only
belatedly be subject to legislative or appellate override.156
The assumption upon which Professor Engstrom’s argument relies
is that greater litigation authority would increase the EEOC’s gate-
keeping power.157 If that assumption is correct, then it follows that
the EEOC’s current litigation efforts act as an effective gatekeeper. 
Moreover, when the EEOC files suit on a plaintiff ’s behalf, it has
already served its gatekeeping purposes by pursuing only truly mer-
itorious claims with a reasonable chance of success.158 The EEOC
152. See supra notes 104, 114 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
155. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
156. David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616,
701-02 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
157. See id.
158. See supra Part II.C. 
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has weeded out frivolous claims and has taken the affirmative step
to represent a plaintiff in federal court.159 Assuming a good faith
drafting effort,160 the EEOC’s pleadings, then, should easily satisfy
the plausibility standard.161
Indeed, the proposition that agency decision-making should be
granted some degree of deference is neither a novel nor radical one.
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., for example, courts
have deferred to reasonable administrative legal interpretations of
ambiguous statutes.162 A central “theoretical justification” for Chev-
ron deference centers around “the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in
question, their intense familiarity with the history and purposes of
the legislation at issue, [and] their practical knowledge of what will
best effectuate those purposes.”163 Tracking the rationale behind
Chevron, this Note proposes that the EEOC—not a federal court—is
159. See supra Part II.C.
160. This Note neither intends to suggest that the EEOC should be free to be careless in
its drafting efforts, nor endorses giving the EEOC a pass for shoddy pleadings. For an
example of a case in which the district court accused the EEOC of poor drafting efforts, see
EEOC v. Hobson Air Conditioning, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-818-L, 2010 WL 3835553, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 28, 2010). In that case, the court reluctantly denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, but suggested that the EEOC failed to “take[ ] about twenty minutes to add a few
sentences with more factual detail.” Id.
161. Proponents of a more scrutinizing standard for pleadings fail to appreciate the extent
to which the federal courts were designed to ensure broad citizen access. See Miller, supra
note 25, at 77. Furthermore, such proponents conflate the following distinct inquiries: (1)
whether a plaintiff ’s pleadings are sufficient under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) to survive a motion
to dismiss and proceed to discovery; and (2) whether that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits—an inquiry that more closely resembles the standard for summary judgment.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring plaintiffs to plead only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)
(requiring that courts grant a motion for summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). As Justice
Thomas opined in Swierkiewicz, “Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
162. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute.”).
163. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 514.
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in the best position to evaluate the merits of a potential lawsuit at
the prediscovery stage.164
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court overruled Conley and announced that
plaintiffs must allege facts rendering their cause of action “plausi-
ble” in Twombly165 and Iqbal,166 the Court stressed that a broader
policy concern motivated its holding.167 In particular, the Court
feared that the liberal pleading standard under Conley had enticed
plaintiffs to file frivolous suits in federal court, dragging defendants
into expensive litigation and forcing them to settle.168
That policy concern becomes considerably less troublesome when
the EEOC files suit on a plaintiff ’s behalf.169 When the EEOC de-
cides to initiate litigation in federal court, as in Port Authority,170
not only has it expended great administrative costs in reviewing the
charge, investigating the claim, and issuing a reasonable cause
determination, but also it has decided to expend limited administra-
tive resources in pursuing the action on the plaintiff ’s behalf.171 At
bottom, such litigation cannot be of the baseless, frivolous sort that
the Court feared in Twombly and Iqbal.172
To be sure, whether the EEOC should be successful in its liti-
gation efforts is an entirely different matter. But if lower courts are
164. Whether any particular legal interpretation that the EEOC might promulgate is en-
titled to Chevron deference is beyond the scope of this Note. But the rationale behind Chevron
nonetheless rings true in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. When the EEOC files suit on
behalf of a plaintiff (or group of plaintiffs), it has investigated the plaintiff ’s charge, rendered
a determination that the employer violated the law, and deemed the case a litigation priority
worthy of the expenditure of limited administrative resources. See supra note 115 and accom-
panying text. As such, the EEOC’s pleadings should easily satisfy the plausibility standard
to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Put differently, the EEOC is “much better
placed than generalist judges” to assess the merits of the case at such an early stage of
litigation. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
310 (1986). 
165. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
166. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
167. See supra Part I.A.
168. See supra notes 39-41.
169. See supra Part II. 
170. See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
171. See supra Part II.C.
172. See supra Part III.A.
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to take seriously the Supreme Court’s word regarding the rationale
for the plausibility standard, courts should not absolve defendant
employers from their duty to file an answer to the EEOC’s com-
plaint.173 Accordingly, absent the extraordinarily unusual case in
which the EEOC has filed a complaint entirely devoid of factual
allegations, the EEOC’s pleadings should survive a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim.174
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